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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may 
fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, 
transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. 
 The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states 
should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is 
rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can 
they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. 
 The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has 
expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved 
very slowly. 
 The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to 
develop military capacity beyond current levels since 
they see economic and social development and disaster 
relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military 
hardware.  
 The RSS depends on international donors such as the 
USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to 
fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire 
material. 
 In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional 
arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the 
foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains 
elusive and the predominance of national interests over 
regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle 
to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the 
RSS, have to become more responsible for their own 
security from their own resources. While larger 
CARICOM economies can do this it, would be difficult 
for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. 
 The CARICOM region including the RSS member 
countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in 
security collaboration. Implementation of the 
recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime 
and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms 
created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 
2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation 
and permanent legacy institutions for the regional 
security toolbox. 
 The most important tier of security relationships for the 
region is the United States and particularly 
USSOUTHCOM.  
 The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which 
the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. 
sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of Caribbean 
countries and promote regional ownership of security 
initiatives. 
 Future developments under discussion by policy makers 
in the Caribbean security environment include the 
granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the 
formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the 
creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. 
 The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM 
partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” 
particularly Canada, the United States and the United 
Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional 
security collaboration.  
3 
 
 Regional security cooperation should embrace wider 
traditional and non-traditional elements of security 
appropriate to the 21
st
 century.  
 
 Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the 
best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and 
procedures already available in the region.  
 
 The objective should not be the creation of new agencies 
but rather the generation of new resources to take 
effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security 
and non-security tools should be combined for both 
strategic and operational purposes.  
 Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of 
tactical and operational actions must be understood and 
appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. 
 The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of 
Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy 
institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security 
cooperation in the Caribbean.  
 
 RSS collaboration should build on the process of 
operational level synergies with traditional military 
partners. In this context, the United States must be a true  
 
 
partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work 
unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. 
 Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many of the factors contributing to crime and violence in the 
Caribbean—drug and weapons trafficking, money 
laundering, and deportees—transcend national boundaries. 
So does the ever present threat of recurring natural disasters. 
As such, they call for regional or international approaches 
and interventions that go beyond the local- or national-level 
responses. This applies to the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) region and to the sub-region of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).
1
 
 
In the global security environment today, and that of the 
foreseeable future, small states that lack capacity and act on 
their own are likely to be marginalized or fall victim to 
international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized 
crime or criminal gangs. The international security 
environment is complex and in continuous change. The 
Caribbean region today, as in the past, is a host to many 
internal and external actors, both state and non-state, each 
with its own distinct agenda. The critical issue is not whether 
Caribbean states should cooperate, but rather in what 
manner. The challenges are to devise the mechanisms to 
bring about such cooperation, agree on how they should be 
implemented and to identify and overcome the obstacles that 
stand in the way of cooperation. 
                                                 
1
 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is an organization of 15 
Caribbean nations and dependencies to promote economic integration 
and cooperation among its members and to coordinate regional foreign 
policy. Its participating members include the seven states of the OECS 
plus The Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. There are also 5 associate members: 
Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and the 
Turks and Caicos. The OECS members are: Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands are 
associate members.   
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This paper will look at the Caribbean Regional Security 
System, and its role and potential in promoting and 
establishing a more effective regional security system.  It 
also discusses how to structure a more operative RSS and 
analyzes its significance for the region and its allies. 
 
THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM (RSS) 
 
Some of the Caribbean’s regional security institutions were 
designed to deal with earlier, more traditional threats to 
national security. In October 1982 four members of the 
OECS—namely, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—signed a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) with Barbados to provide for 
“mutual assistance on request”. Saint Kitts and Nevis joined 
following independence in 1983, and Grenada followed two 
years later, after Operation Urgent Fury, a U.S. intervention 
(with RSS support) to restore legitimate government to that 
country. The MOU was updated in 1992 and the system 
acquired juridical status in March 1996 under the Treaty 
which was signed at St. Georges, Grenada.  
 
The RSS was conceived as a mutual defense treaty against 
external aggression or internal coup attempts. Much later, in 
1996, the Memorandum of Understanding was upgraded into 
a treaty. This greatly expanded the scope of issues in which 
the RSS would be engaged. 
2
 Today the Eastern Caribbean 
offers abundant transshipment points for illicit narcotics 
primarily from Venezuela destined for North American, 
European and domestic Caribbean markets. The countries of 
the OECS suffer from dramatic increases in crime rates as 
more narcotics remain on the streets for local consumption 
                                                 
2
 For details of the RSS Treaty see: 
http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d00000de.htm. Information on the RSS is 
available from the RSS webpage: http://www.rss.org.bb/ and from 
sources in the Bibliography. 
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and organized gangs take control of distribution in the 
lucrative drug trade. In addition, manpower resources are 
scarce, and gaps in the comprehensive and timely vetting of 
all officers serving in sensitive positions contribute to the 
vulnerability of narcotics corruption. 
3
  
 
The ability of the RSS alone to deal with this onslaught is 
limited since its operations are not Caribbean-wide (i.e. in 
terms of CARICOM). While the RSS’s remit has increased 
dramatically, its capabilities have increased slowly.
4
 
Cooperative regional approaches offer a clear advantage for 
addressing a wider range of security issues such as the 
preservation of democracy and human rights, and 
transnational challenges, such as environmental pollution 
and disaster management. In short, current security 
challenges in the region require integrated solutions. 
 
RE-VAMPING THE RSS EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The RSS could be made more effective but, it has several 
limitations. Since the late 1960’s proposals to establish a 
region wide regular army or defense force have failed. 
During the 1980s, at political levels, it was rejected as too 
costly an initiative, some political elements charged that the 
measure was designed by the U.S. to keep conservative pro-
U.S. governments in power, and at other times it was 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed study of the problem see the (2007) Joint UNODC-World 
Bank Report No. 37820. 
4
 Latest available figures (2008) put the strength of combined police and 
military personnel from which the RSS can draw down at 5,736. The Air 
Wing has two C-26 aircraft, capable of surveillance, civil defense 
operations, logistics, troop transport and search and rescue. From 2002 to 
2008 it had flown more than 1500 missions and rates as one of the 
successful counter drug air operations in the region. For comparison, the 
Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force alone has 5,126 regular forces 
including Coast Guard and Air Guard units, and a number of modern 
naval units including OPVs and armed helicopters. 
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condemned as being an attempt to militarize the Eastern 
Caribbean. Underlying some of the opposition may be fears 
that a stronger and larger military organization might in the 
future not be subordinate to civilian rule, or be used by larger 
states to encroach on the sovereignty of smaller island 
nations. Even today the member governments of the RSS are 
reluctant to make military security a priority or to develop 
capacity much beyond current levels. Economic and social 
development takes precedence in the thinking of the political 
leadership. Furthermore, the military contribution to creating 
and maintaining stable and democratic societies is perceived 
by some policy-making elites in the region largely as a 
constabulary role, fighting crime, providing internal security 
at the local level or in a neighboring Caribbean country, or as 
a mechanism to provide disaster relief. These activities, it is 
argued, require minimal or no investment in military 
hardware and equipment. 
5
  
 
Today the larger CARICOM countries do invest in defense 
while the OECS countries in the RSS have tended not to do 
so. The result is that budgets for defense are low in the RSS 
member countries 
6
 and there is constant dependence on 
international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, 
and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain 
equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts 
an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus 
                                                 
5
 For detailed discussions and analyses of attempts and failures to 
promote a region wide defense force see the scholarly work by Caribbean 
military personnel: Bostic (1995), Dillon (2001), Bishop (2002), and 
Ogilvie (2007).  The body of work by Ivelaw Griffith provides the most 
complete insight and analysis into the quest for security in the Caribbean. 
He treats the perceptions of regional political elites toward security in 
(Griffith 1991).   
6
  The RSS budget for fiscal year 2009-2010 was US$ 4,780,848, 
provided by member states. 
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is not likely in the foreseeable future. 
7
 It will also be 
difficult to create a formal military security arrangement in 
the CARICOM region and in the OECS sub-region based on 
either the “collective” or “cooperative” security concepts 
because there is no agreement on a common military threat 
perception nor is there a real capacity to employ decisive 
military force without the cooperation of external friendly 
powers. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the 
predominance of national interests over regional 
considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any 
CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism.
8
  
 
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY 
 
Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the 
RSS, have to become more responsible for their own 
security. Security cooperation to achieve this end must be the 
result of a systemic process that identifies common interests 
and threats and a coherent approach to deal with the issues. 
Regional security cooperation should be based on the reality 
that it would embrace the wider elements of traditional and 
non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21
st
 
century. 
 
Fortunately, there is a history of operational level 
coordination among the CARICOM militaries as seen in 
times of crisis situations in Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Haiti.
9
 Operational arrangements also permit individual 
member governments to be included in the planning and 
decision-making, while also allowing them to control their 
                                                 
7
 See above Bostic, Dillon, Bishop, and Olgivie for countervailing 
arguments. 
8
 Bailes and Cottey (2006) provide cogent arguments for both 
cooperative and collective security arrangements in several regions of the 
world. 
9
 See  APPENDIX RSS: MOBILIZATIONS SINCE INCEPTION.  
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military forces and its assets and reserve the decision over 
whether to participate in any military activity. It is the view 
of several civilian and military analysts that over time, such 
arrangements increase the ability of the participating military 
and Special Service Units (SSU) to build standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for interaction with larger forces in 
international duty.
10
 Nevertheless, the Caribbean militaries 
will have to structure military capacity from their own 
resources and become more responsible for their own 
security. While larger CARICOM economies such as 
Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados (an 
RSS Member) are already managing to do this, it would be 
difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same.  
 
A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
 
The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM 
partners, as well as with its traditional external partners in 
devising a general framework for regional security 
collaboration. Regional cooperation in combating 
transnational organized crime and drug trafficking requires a 
standardized legal regime. The internationally accepted 
vehicle for this standardization is the United Nations system 
of drugs and crime conventions, namely the three drug 
conventions (the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 
1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances), the Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (including the protocols on 
Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms), and the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption (IACC). While 
nearly every country in the region has ratified the drug 
                                                 
10
 See Ferguson (2001), Bishop (2002) and Sutton (1993). 
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conventions, compliance is much less in the case of the 
crime conventions, particularly the firearms protocol and 
IACC. However, in the CARICOM region even more direct 
regional initiatives have been undertaken and they hold the 
keys to such collaboration. 
 
First, the 2002 recommendations of the Regional Task Force 
on Crime and Security (RTFCS) identified the major 
challenges to security and recommended approaches to deal 
with related problems such as drugs and weapons trafficking, 
and crime and violence reduction. 
11
 The report of the 
RTFCS shied away from making strong recommendations at 
the national level since the region is regarded as far too 
heterogeneous for one-size-fits-all recommendations for 
interventions at the national level. But the RSS cooperated 
fully in its deliberations and implementation. 
 
Second, the structure and mechanisms created for the staging 
of Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007), some of them mandated 
by international agencies and governments, gave way to an 
unprecedented level of cooperation with the result that many 
mechanisms and institutions were created.  The 
Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), 
based in Trinidad and Tobago, became the main agency for 
the regional security implementation during CWC 2007. An 
unprecedented confidence building measure was the creation 
of a Single Domestic Space encompassing all OECS 
countries and Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
The Space implied that citizens of these countries and the 
nationals of other countries visiting from other parts of the 
world were free to move within the Space after completing 
migration formalities in the first port of entry. IMPACS 
spawned two permanent sub-agencies: the Joint Regional 
Communications Center (JRCC) and the Regional 
                                                 
11
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/regional_issues/crime_and_sec
urity_task_force_report_2002.pdf 
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Intelligence Fusion Center (RIFC) that are now permanent 
legacy institutions and a testimony to improving regional 
security cooperation in the Caribbean.
12
  
 
Clearly, security cooperation must utilize to the maximum 
the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and 
procedures already available in the region. The objective 
should not be on the creation of new agencies but rather 
focus on generating new resources to take effective 
operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-
security tools should be combined for both strategic and 
operational purposes. 
 
Hemispheric and Global Initiatives 
A viable RSS will also have to build on operational level 
cooperation with other Caribbean militaries, with the United 
States, Canada, France and Holland; the “Atlantic Powers” 
that have maintained traditional interests in the region, and a 
new player in the region--China.
13
 Hemispheric and global 
                                                 
12
 On IMPACS see: http://www.caricomimpacs.org/; for full details of 
the implementation of CWC 2007, the Single Domestic Space and legacy 
institutions see: http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/pdf/07.pdf. 
13
  China has in place an agreement for the free provision of military 
assistance with Barbados (an RSS member), and an agreement for the 
provision of military training and equipment to Guyana and Jamaica. For 
an in depth study of China’s military engagement in Latin America, see 
Ellis (2011). The author suggests that Chinese military engagement with 
the region may be understood in terms of five interrelated types of 
activities: (1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level 
military-to-military interactions, (3) military sales, (4) military-relevant 
commercial interactions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within Latin 
America with military-strategic implications. Canada has been active in 
the region in the area of security cooperation since the 1960’s. Its 
Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP) is widely respected 
among the Caribbean military. In 2011 Money from a CAN$15 million 
Anti-Crime Capacity Building Fund has been disbursed to support RSS 
Air Surveillance Program. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
in partnership with the RSS is developing new police training modules 
12 
 
implications of tactical and operational actions must be 
understood and appreciated by the forces of the member 
states. Therefore, building regional security cooperation will 
result only from a long-term cooperative, multilateral civil-
military effort. 
 
The Role of the United States 
An important tier of regional security relationships for the 
region is the U.S, in particular USSOUTHCOM. 
Independently, the Eastern Caribbean countries have 
bilateral maritime counternarcotic agreements with the 
United States. The U.S. Coast Guard provides technical and 
logistical support for over 40 maritime police and security 
vessels in the region. The U.S has trained militarized SSUs 
in each member state of the RSS. Programs such as the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
provide valuable assistance by increasing military force 
capabilities and professional training. The RSS participates 
in the TRADEWINDS exercises that serve to enhance 
cooperation, interoperability and familiarity between the 
forces and in Peacekeeping exercises conducted in Central 
America (FAHUM and PKO NORTH). However, law 
enforcement capacity in the OECS continues to be under-
resourced and plagued with antiquated legal codes and 
corruption in the ranks. Collectively, the RSS members also 
struggle with communication and coordination of effort 
despite their relative close proximity to each other. 
 
Unfortunately, the regional perception is that the United 
States still accords the Caribbean a low priority in its global 
security interests. The Caribbean countries can no longer 
play the “Cuban card” as they did in the 1970s and 1980s as 
an argument for military assistance from the U.S. The 
positive aspect is that the continued peacetime engagement 
                                                                                                    
for the Caribbean. The United Kingdom and the Caribbean have also had 
a wide ranging Security Cooperation Plan since 2003. 
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mission for USSOUTHCOM is what will signify the 
operational relationship between the U.S. and the Caribbean. 
The continuing USSOUTHCOM mandate to building 
military cooperation in the region under its purview is 
critical for the operational relationship between the U.S. and 
the RSS for the entire Caribbean region. There should not be 
any radical shift in the USSOUTHCOM approach. 
 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) 
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] launched on 
May 27, 2010, in which the countries of the RSS participate, 
is a useful tool to strengthen the capabilities of Caribbean 
countries. The objectives of U.S. policy as outlined in the 
CBSI are to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, advance 
public safety and security, and promote social justice. CBSI 
programs in support of these objectives will develop and 
strengthen the capacity of regional defense, law enforcement, 
and justice sector institutions to detect, interdict, and 
successfully prosecute criminal elements operating in the 
region. CBSI will directly address rising crime and violence 
through demand reduction and crime prevention programs 
while concurrently developing national and regional 
capacities to provide greater socio-economic alternatives for 
vulnerable populations. To enhance the collective capacity of 
the Eastern Caribbean to combat trafficking and 
transnational crime, CBSI will provide support for 
information sharing networks, joint interagency operations 
and regional training initiatives to promote interoperability. 
The definition of “security” under the CBSI is a broad 
mandate that goes beyond assistance for security forces and 
anti-trafficking efforts.
14
 
 
The United States is committed to working with its 
Caribbean neighbors to combat threats that endanger mutual 
                                                 
14
  On CBSI details see: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/158556.pdf 
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security. CBSI signals the beginning of this collaborative 
approach—one that identifies and provides appropriate and 
sufficient resources to institutions and communities in a 
common effort to support their efforts and define mutual 
strategic priorities. For example, under the U.S. Embassy’s 
Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS) in Barbados and as part of 
the long-term U.S. commitment to support and build the 
capacity of the RSS, the RSS Air Wing is receiving 
operational support for flight hours and upgrades and 
maintenance on key equipment. 
15
 Under the CBSI the 
maritime capabilities of the RSS are being strengthened both 
on the surface and sub-surface. As the CBSI is implemented, 
the U.S. expects to strengthen its capacity building efforts in 
the region through the delivery of new state-of-the-art 
maritime interdiction platforms as well as command, control, 
communication and information systems in order to counter 
illicit trafficking in the Eastern Caribbean.
16
 
 
Regional collaboration for the RSS should build on the 
process of operational level cooperation with traditional 
military partners. In this context the United States should be 
regarded as a true partner with shared interests and assist the 
RSS to aspire to a high degree of professionalism. 
Experience demonstrates that simply training and providing 
troops with equipment is not entirely effective. The military 
leadership should also be upgraded at all levels. The concept 
of multiple centers of gravity, to include public opinion and 
leadership, must be taught and applied in the RSS. The 
                                                 
15
 In November 2010 a ground power unit (GPU) and an aircraft TUG to 
replace older units that support operations of the two RSS C-26 aircraft.  
The total value was US 79,000. In 2010 two go-fast interceptor vessels 
were delivered to each RSS member country. In addition, 35 sets (5 sets 
to each member state) of diving gear (valued atUS$70,000) were 
provided increasing the ability to conduct sub-surface counter-terrorist 
searches of critical port infrastructure. Source: US Embassy Bridgetown, 
Barbados. 
16
  INCSR (2011) 
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power of information and public diplomacy and the penalties 
that are paid when these instruments of power are not used, 
channeled, or harnessed must be emphasized. Similarly, the 
notion that inaction can be as much of a threat to stability 
and security as any other destabilizing factor must be 
accepted and internalized. 
 
FUTURE TRENDS IN THE RSS AND THE CARIBBEAN 
MILITARY  
 
Facing pressure from governments, transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs) and drug cartels are taking their 
criminality and violence away from Mexico and Colombia 
into Central America and the CARICOM region. TCOs will 
go to the point of least resistance in a “balloon effect” with 
types of technology in advance of regional law 
enforcement.
17
 The RSS members are even less equipped 
than their larger Caribbean neighbors to combat these 
problems. Lack of U.S. support is not an option. Proactive 
RSS participation in the CBSI, and allowing the RSS to take 
a leading role in establishing strategic and operational 
priorities regarding law enforcement and counternarcotics 
program needs provides an efficient and effective means to 
accomplish security goals under CBSI.
18
  
 
The need to fight crime in a collaborative approach rather 
than as separate entities was emphasized by participants at 
the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) in 
Port-of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago in February 2011, which 
                                                 
17
 Estimates are that the RSS is only catching five percent of the total 
volume of drugs that is being shipped. 
http://www.barbadosadvocate.com/newsitem.asp?NewsID=12798. 
18
 The commitment of the Government of Barbados in securing resources 
to complete the integrated coastal radar system and invest in both 
maritime and air assets will achieve a new level of domain awareness 
that will benefit the Eastern Caribbean. 
16 
 
brought together 15 chiefs of defense from the region. The 
sentiment was echoed by General Douglas Fraser, 
USSOUTHCOM commander at the same conference.
19
  
 
Under discussion by Caribbean military chiefs is the 
evolving role of the military into nontraditional roles to 
combat illicit trafficking and crime. Traditionally defense 
forces have had primary responsibility for national defense 
and the police for internal security. A sea change in this 
division of labor will lead to closer relationships between the 
military and corresponding law enforcement agencies. There 
is general consensus that the region is at the point where the 
armed forces should be granted law enforcement authority. 
Also under discussion (in March 2011) by National Security 
Ministers from countries represented on the RSS were 
proposals for the formation of a single OECS Police Force, 
and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement 
space. 
20
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The institutional mechanisms to confront dangers to national 
and public security in the member states of the RSS exist and 
the efforts are commendable. Limitations of capability have 
not stifled initiatives or the will to do better. The reliance on 
external support is a necessity, because realistically regional 
resources are limited. Security challenges are fluid 
demanding constant upgrades of institutions and materiel to 
meet them. Consequently, there are implications, both  
                                                 
19
 Diálogo (2011) 
20
  See the interview with Brigadier General Edmund Dillon of the TTDF 
in Diálogo (2010) and the report of the security ministers meeting: 
http://www.nationnews.com/articles/view/regional-security-ministers-
meeting/ 
 
17 
 
positive and negative, in regional efforts to constantly adjust 
the architecture of regional security collaboration and 
cooperation. 
18 
 
APPENDIX 
RSS MOBILIZATIONS SINCE INCEPTION 
DATE NAME OF RSS 
OPERATION  
COUNTRY REASON 
1983 Grenada 
Intervention 
Grenada Restore a government 
1989 Hugo Antigua, 
Montserrat, 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Assistance in the 
aftermath of Hurricane 
Hugo 
1990 Coup Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Provide additional 
security in the aftermath 
of an attempted Coup 
d’état in Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1994 Internal Security St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Prison Uprising 
1995 Luis, Marilyn Antigua and 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Assistance in the 
aftermath of Hurricanes 
Luis and Marilyn 
1998 Georges St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
Assistance in the 
aftermath of Hurricane 
Georges 
1998 Weed eater St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
Eradication of Cannabis  
2003 Bordelais St. Lucia  Transfer prisoners to a 
new prison facility 
2004 Ivan Relief 
Efforts 
Grenada Assistance in the 
aftermath of Hurricane 
Ivan 
2006 Glendairy Barbados Restore Peace after Prison 
Uprising 
2007 CWC 07 Member 
States 
Security for Cricket 
World Cup 
2009 Vincypac St. Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
Eradication of Cannabis 
2010 Haiti Haiti Assistance in the 
aftermath of the Haiti 
2010 Earthquake 
19 
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